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ABSTRACT
This paper charts the nature of political cleavage between major 
parties in post-Arab Spring elections in five Mediterranean region 
countries, with data from online opt-in surveys. We compare the 
Moroccan elections, held under a consolidated authoritarian 
regime, with the transitional cases of Tunisia and Egypt as well as 
the more mature democracies of Turkey and Israel. Voter opinions 
are obtained on 30 salient issues, and parties and voters are aligned 
along two dimensions. We trace country-specific cleavage patterns 
and reflections of party system maturity in these five countries. The 
cases of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco reveal that in less settled cleavage 
structures there is little congruence between vote propensities for 
parties and agreement levels with policy positions compared to the 
more institutionalized democracies of Israel and Turkey where voters 
exhibit a higher likelihood to vote for a party as the distance between 
the voter and the party in the policy space gets smaller.
Introduction
A series of uprisings that became known as the Arab Spring resulted in the toppling of 
autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011, which set into motion a series of—at 
least partly—free and open elections in long-established dictatorships. However, in Egypt, 
the democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, was toppled by a military inter-
vention. In Tunisia, unrest and political crisis continued with the assassination of two 
high-profile politicians from the leftist secular opposition. While at the end of 2014 a dem-
ocratic election brought a new president to power in Tunisia, elections in Egypt were pre-
pared for November 2015 under ever more repressive conditions. What defines the underlying 
logic, structure of these new party systems and the nature of party competition remains 
ambiguous due to the lack of data from the region. The Arab Barometer (http://www.arab-
barometer.org/) and the World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp) 
remain limited in dealing with political choice in the region since neither of these allows for 
determining the proximity or agreement levels of respondents with political parties. We aim 
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in this article to provide an answer as to how much congruence exists in these founding 
elections between voter preferences and vote propensities for political parties compared 
to relatively more stable and institutionalized democracies in the region. We adopt the spatial 
voting framework, asserting that voters tend to support parties and candidates closer to 
them. Comparing the two relatively institutionalized electoral democracies in the region—
Israel and Turkey—with emerging party systems in post-Arab Spring Tunisia and Egypt—as 
well as with the Moroccan party system under monarchical non-democratic tutelage, allows 
us to diagnose the influence of the nature of electoral democracy upon the emerging pat-
terns of policy congruence between voters and parties.
Since national election studies are absent in three of our cases, we developed online Vote 
Advice Applications (V.A.A.). V.A.A. ask voter opinions about salient issues and places each 
of them in a multidimensional political landscape where they can compare their policy 
preferences with official positions of political parties.1 V.A.A. are particularly useful in gen-
erating massive opt-in samples but have inference-based limitations in representativeness. 
Their substantive utilization in spatial voting models and party mapping research provides 
new methodological and empirical opportunities. Particularly in settings where the academic 
infrastructure for national elections studies is missing, V.A.A. allow us to sample large pools 
of voters in all five countries that enable us to analyse the spatial cleavages in these 
electorates.
Spatial competition in comparative perspective
The linkage between policy preferences of voters and positions of parties is a central question 
in democratic politics. Miller and Stokes argued that parties that neglect voter opinions and 
expectations are unlikely to garner significant electoral support.2 This idea of policy congru-
ence between parties and their electorate assumes that voters determine their party choice 
based on issue positions of parties and understand the relative ‘distances’ of the parties on 
issue dimensions. The central assumption in spatial voting models is that voters will cast 
their votes for the party that is closest to them in the issue space.3 The Downsian model is 
criticized for its assumption of a unidimensional space and its neglect of various impacts—
those of political leaders or charismatic figures,4 of evaluations of the incumbents and of 
campaign effects or other non-rational sentiments—on the final vote choice. Also, a direc-
tional model of voting argues that the direction of the (dis)agreement is more important 
than proximity between voters and parties on a given issue.5 An alternative view of party 
competition is built on the idea that parties emphasize different policy issues during a 
1see, a.P.M. Krouwel, M.t. Wall and t. Vitiello, ‘the Practicalities of issuing Vote advice: a new Methodology for Profiling and 
Matching’, International Journal of Electronic Governance, 5(3/4) (2012), pp. 223–243; and a.P.M. Krouwel, t. Vitiello and 
M. Wall, ‘Voting advice applications as Campaign actors: Mapping Vaas’ interactions with Parties, Media and Voters’, in 
Matching Voters with Parties and Candidates: Voting Advice Applications in Comparative Perspective, ed. d. Garzia and 
s. Marschall (Colchester: eCPr Press, 2014), pp. 67–78.
2W.e. Miller and d.e. stokes, ‘Constituency influence in Congress’, The American Political Science Review, 57(1) (1963), 
pp. 45–56.
3see a. downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (new York: harper, 1957); J.M. enelow and M.J. hinich, The Spatial Theory 
of Voting: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1984).
4see for instance, i. Mcallister, ‘the Personalization of Politics’, in The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, ed. r.J. dalton 
and h.d. Klingemann (new York: oxford university Press, 2007), pp. 571–588; and l. Karvonen, The Personalization of 
Politics: A Study of Parliamentary Democracies (Colchester: eCPr Press, 2010).
5G. rabinowitz and s.e. Macdonald, ‘a directional theory of issue Voting’, The American Political Science Review, 83(1) (1989), 
pp. 93–121.
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campaign. In this perspective, parties try to mould voters’ preferences by differentially 
emphasizing issues that promote their strengths and avoiding those which give an advan-
tage to their competitors.6 Alternatively, in party systems where tribal allegiances and cli-
entelistic mobilization patterns are prevalent, the link between individual policy preferences 
and official policy positions will be weak.
In a simple Downsian model, we expect an inverse linkage between distance to a party 
and the likelihood to vote for that party. Additionally, transitional democracies, as opposed 
to more institutionalized ones, should differ from one another. The pace with which the 
decline in the likelihood to vote occurs could vary from country to country due to various 
historical and institutional reasons.
Talking about cleavage politics reflecting social and attitudinal bases of political parties, 
Enyedi asserts that ‘institutionalization is supposed to lead to stability and predictability’ 
(p. 300, italics added).7 As Mainwaring and Scully argue, stability in the patterns of interaction, 
strong party roots in society, party legitimacy and strong party organization not only lead 
to party system institutionalization but also a more predictable representation of group 
loyalties and cleavage positions by political parties.8 As the ideological commitments of the 
parties are expected to be better known and digested by the electorate in more institution-
alized settings, the rate of decline should be steeper as historical commitments of the parties 
and institutional support bases will push down the likelihood to vote as distance grows in 
the issue space.
Most empirical research on party–voter congruence is conducted in advanced industrial 
democracies of Europe and North America. There are several cases outside advanced democ-
racies in which the implications of spatial voting models have been tested, including Ukraine,9 
Chile,10 Russia11 and Taiwan.12 The findings of these studies have shown that a low-dimen-
sional political space can be derived in each case and the proximity of parties’ positions to 
6for different versions of this approach see under the ‘dominance principle’: W.h. riker, The Art of Political Manipulation 
(new haven, Ct: Yale university Press, 1986); W.h. riker, ‘rhetorical interaction in the ratification Campaigns’, in Agenda 
Formation, ed. W.h. riker (ann arbor: university of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 81–126; the ‘saliency theory’: i. Budge and 
d. farlie, Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies (london: 
George allen and unwin, 1983); i. Budge, ‘issues, dimensions, and agenda Change in Postwar democracies: long-term 
trends in Party election Programs and newspaper reports in twenty-three democracies’, in Agenda Formation, ed. W.h. 
riker (ann arbor: university of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 41–80; and the ‘issue ownership theory’: J.r. Petrocik, ‘issue 
ownership in Presidential elections’, American Journal of Science Review, 58(4) (1996), pp. 825–850; J.r. Petrocik, W.l. 
Benoit and G.J. hansen, ‘issue ownership and Presidential Campaigning, 1952–2000’, Political Science Quarterly, 118(4) 
(2003), pp. 599–626.
7Z. enyedi, ‘the social and attitudinal Basis of Political Parties: Cleavage Politics revisited’, European Review, 16(3) (2008), 
pp. 287–304.
8s. Mainwaring and t. scully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (stanford, Ca: stanford 
university Press, 1995). see also, r.h. dix, ‘democratization and the institutionalization of latin american Political Parties’, 
Comparative Political Studies, 24(4) (1992), pp. 488–511; M. Kuenzi and G. lambright, ‘Party system institutionalization 
in 30 african Countries’, Party Politics, 7(4) (2001), pp. 437–468; s. Mainwaring and M. torcal, ‘Party system institutionalization 
and Party system theory after the third Wave of democratization’, in Handbook of Party Politics, ed. r.s. Katz and W. Crotty 
(london: sage, 2006), pp. 204–227 on party system institutionalization and Ş. Yardımcı-Geyikçi, ‘Party institutionalization 
and democratic Consolidation: turkey and southern europe in Comparative Perspective’, Party Politics, 21(4) (2015), 
pp. 527–538, on party institutionalization, which obviously is linked to party system institutionalization but rather refers 
to inner organizational features of political parties rather than their system-level characteristics.
9M.J. hinich, V. Khmelko and P.C. ordeshook, ‘ukraine’s 1998 Parliamentary elections: a spatial analysis’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 
15(2) (1999), pp. 149–185.
10J.K. dow, ‘a spatial analysis of Candidate Competition in dual Member districts: the 1989 Chilean senatorial elections’, in 
Empirical Studies in Comparative Politics, ed. M.J. hinich and M.C. Munger (new York: springer us, 1998), pp. 233–256.
11M. Myagkov and P.C. ordeshook, ‘the spatial Character of russia’s new democracy’, in Empirical Studies in Comparative 
Politics, ed. M.J. hinich and M.C. Munger (new York: springer us, 1998), pp. 273–305.
12t.M. lin, Y.h. Chu and M.J. hinich, ‘Conflict displacement and regime transition in taiwan: a spatial analysis’, World Politics, 
48(4) (1996), pp. 453–481.
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voters’ ideal points explains their party choices. Additionally, Çarkoğlu and Hinich’s analysis 
of Turkey shows that two historically rooted separate dimensions—reflecting a centre–
periphery cleavage that largely overlaps with the conventional left–right dimension and 
attitudes towards socio-political change—dominate the ideological space in the Turkish 
party system.13
Deegan-Krause argues that studies of cleavage structures in the Middle East usually only 
include Turkey and Israel, as they are the only countries in the region which were able to 
develop competitive party systems.14 We now turn to our five country cases for an in-depth 
look at the character of vote choices as they relate to party system institutionalization.
Democratic consolidation and party competition in five Middle Eastern 
countries
To diagnose the nature of political parties’ linkages with their constituencies, we use the 
expert survey data from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (D.A.L.P.)15 which 
show that Egypt and Turkey have higher levels of clientelistic party–voter linkage mecha-
nisms (3.66 and 3.63 on a 1–4 scale, respectively) than Morocco (3.46) and Israel (2.92). 
Conversely, a programmatic measure shows that Israel has the highest programmatic linkage 
with voters (0.33 on an additive index which ranges from 0.05 to 0.68), while Egypt and 
Turkey are moderately programmatic (0.29 and 0.28) and Moroccan parties only establish 
low programmatic linkages (0.11).
Rahat and Hazan argue that in the Israeli 2013 elections, the party system became more 
unstable.16 Their argument suggests that there were shifts across parties thanks to the rise 
of socio-economic issues and decline of security concerns. The fact that there is a rapid 
emergence of a new organizational setting which can address abrupt changes in issue sali-
ency is a sign of party–voter responsiveness that we argue for the Israeli case. On the other 
side of the spectrum, Al-Ississ and Atallah show for the Egyptian case that private patronage 
benefits (e.g. public-sector employment) have a substantial effect on the mobilization of 
voters.17 In fact, this effect is stronger than consequences of the secularist ideological outlook 
and lower than pro-change political attitudes. This finding supports our argument in the 
sense that non-ideational factors such as personal gains play a crucial role in Egypt where 
the party system is less consolidated than Israel. Therefore, we are not able to capture pecu-
liar, non-ideational and apolitical factors that can be relatively more important in voters’ 
decision to support a party. In such cases, we expect political attitudes to remain secondary 
at best, and our empirical findings present evidence for such lack of congruence. By demo-
cratic consolidation in the Middle East, we refer to ideological congruence between parties 
and voters rather than institutional continuity of democratic procedures. Therefore, our 
conceptualization of democratic consolidation is minimalist in the sense that it is based 
13a. Çarkoğlu and M.J. hinich, ‘a spatial analysis of turkish Party Preferences’, Electoral Studies, 25(2) (2006), pp. 369–392.
14K. deegan-Krause, ‘new dimensions of Political Cleavage’, in The Oxford Handbook of Political Science, ed. r.J. dalton and 
h.d. Klingemann (new York: oxford university Press, 2007), pp. 538–544.
15for details of the dalP data-set, see https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/ and h. Kitschelt, Data-set of the Democratic 
Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) (durham, nC: duke university, 2013). https://sites.duke.edu/democracylink-
age/ (accessed 16 april 2017).
16G. rahat and r.Y. hazan, ‘increased Personalisation in an unstable Party system: the 2013 elections in israel’, 
Representation, 49(3) (2013), pp. 375–389.
17M. al-ississ and s. atallah, ‘Patronage and ideology in electoral Behaviour: evidence from egypt’s first Presidential elections’, 
European Journal of Political Economy, 37 (2015), pp. 241–248.
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solely on a peculiar reason (congruence) for why voters choose a party over others. We expect 
such consolidation to occur with institutionalization of political parties, a functioning elec-
toral democracy, relatively acceptable levels of press freedom, and substantively free for-
mation of parties. Through these mechanisms, voters may be able to develop stronger and 
more substantive ideological ties with political parties and, over time, this would yield dem-
ocratic consolidation. To better explain this argument and conceptualization, we first present 
contextual details from our cases.
In Israel, one single cleavage superimposes itself upon all other political divisions: the 
regional conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Ever since the Six Day War, the main 
Israeli political parties have been deeply divided over the future of the captured territories.18 
Security issues have structured the vote more than any other social division because such 
matters became interlocked with the religious–secular split and nationalist attitudes. Shamir 
and Arian argue that identity issues are increasingly defining the Israeli vote.19 Hence, the 
salience of identity issues results in a combination of policy preferences and party support 
while fortifying existing cleavages.20 Over time, the welding of religious nationalism with a 
‘hawkish’, anti-territorial concession attitude on security and the amalgamation of secularism 
with a ‘dovish’ stance on the territorial question, resulted in a deep political rift in Israeli 
society and politics.
In contrast, Shalev argued that class voting is present in Israel, yet that class is closely 
related to ethnicity.21 The complex interaction between geographical community, ethnicity, 
class and religion, as well as the role of the state in socio-economic redistribution, makes it 
difficult in Israel to estimate the independent effect of social class on voting behaviour.22 
Government policies aimed at concentrating specific immigrant waves in targeted areas of 
Israel have created regional socio-economic disparities.23 There are clear differences in voting 
patterns between immigrants from earlier and later waves, which attests to class voting as 
well.24 An analysis of party platforms showed that the economy is the second most salient 
cleavage in Israel, which together with security seems to underpin political competition in 
Israel.25
Religion also structures voting behaviour in Israel. Barnea and Schwartz found that tra-
ditional religious values are the most powerful discriminator for voting behaviour.26 This 
state-religion dimension is closely related to the liberal–conservative continuum, to which 
issues of individual rights and freedom are aligned. Earlier studies also found a positive 
18a. arian and M. shamir, ‘a decade later, the World had Changed, the Cleavage structure remained: israel 1996–2006’, Party 
Politics, 14(6) (2008), pp. 685–705.
19M. shamir and a. arian, ‘Collective identity and electoral Competition in israel’, The American Political Science Review, 
93(2) (1999), pp. 265–277. see also, a. arian et al., ‘the election Compass: Party Profiling and Voter attitudes’, in The Elections 
in Israel 2009, ed. a. arian and M. shamir (Piscataway, n.J.: transaction Books, 2011), pp. 275–298.
20h.M. stoll, ‘social Cleavages, Political institutions and Party systems: Putting Preferences Back into the fundamental equation 
of Politics’ (doctoral diss., stanford university, 2005), p. 108.
21M. shalev, ‘liberalization and the transformation of the Political economy’, in The New Israel: Peacemaking and 
Liberalization, ed. G. shafir and Y. Peled (new York: Westview Press, 2000), pp. 129–159.
22M. shalev and s. Kis, ‘social Cleavages among non-arab Voters: a new analysis’, in The Elections in Israel, 1999, ed. a. arian 
and M. shamir (albany, n.Y.: state university of new York Press, 2002), pp. 67–96.
23J.t. shuval and e. leshem, ‘the sociology of Migration in israel: a Critical View’, in Immigration to Israel: Sociological 
Perspectives, ed. e. leshem and J.t. shuval (new Brunswick, n.J.: transaction Publishers, 1998), pp. 3–49.
24s.M. lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective (new Brunswick, n.J.: 
transaction Publishers, 1979).
25stoll, ‘social Cleavages, Political institutions’.
26M.f. Barnea and s.h. schwartz, ‘Values and Voting’, Political Psychology, 19(1) (1998), pp. 17–40.
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correlation between religious observation and voting for right-wing and religious parties. 
Religious parties receive support almost exclusively from religious voters.27
A similar phenomenon of reduced political dimensionality is observed in Turkey as well. 
Çarkoğlu shows for the 1950–1995 period that party manifesto emphases along two dimen-
sions converge towards a more universalist end opposing local traditionalist emphases as 
well as towards civil society as opposed to government-controlled economic argumenta-
tion.28 Hazama argues, ‘social cleavages and the party system in Turkey seem to be heading 
for convergence.’ (p. 379).29 However, Çarkoğlu and Hinich’s spatial analysis still reveals the 
importance of a sui generis centre–periphery cleavage. On the one hand lies a secularism 
(or left à la Turca) vs. Islamism (or right-wing conservatism) dimension while on the other a 
status quo (or Turkish nationalism) vs. reform (or acceptance of Kurdish identity) dimension 
exists.30 The rise of a dominant party—the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi—A.K.P.)—and the formation of a predominant party system suggest a polit-
ical, mental and attitudinal differentiation and polarization if not a segregation within Turkish 
society.31
While Turkey and Israel are usually presented as ‘consolidated’ democracies, some reser-
vations should be made. The Israeli and Turkish cases not only show a reduced dimensionality 
of the political space, with a contemporaneous social and political polarization on the dom-
inant dimension, but also continuous leadership control over political parties. In both coun-
tries, party system consolidation is undermined by political ‘entrepreneurship’ of leaders 
either founding new parties that are heavily under personal control or if parties are taken 
over and continue to exist, these organizations are transformed, so that leadership control 
is optimized. Moreover, Turkey’s democracy has experienced several disruptions and reversals 
due to repeated military coups (such as the 1980 military intervention) and constant tensions 
between the military establishment and party leaders.32 While the Turkish political system 
was able to conserve its competitive electoral structure, it did nevertheless develop into a 
27for research on religious voting in israel see, a. arian, The Choosing People: Voting Behavior in Israel (Cleveland, oh: Press 
of Case Western reserve university, 1973), pp. 55–56; C. Zuckerman-Bareli, ‘the religious factor in opinion formation 
among israeli Youth’, in On Ethnic and Religious Diversity in Israel, ed. s. Poll and e. Krausz (tel aviv: Bar ilan university, 
1975), pp. 53–89; P. Burstein, ‘social Cleavages and Party Choice in israel: a log-linear analysis’, American Political Science 
Review, 72(1) (1978), pp. 107–108; s. Zelniker and M. Kahan, ‘religion and nascent Cleavages: the Case of israel’s national 
religious Party’, Comparative Politics, 9(1) (1976), pp. 34–35; i. Greilsammer, ‘Campaign strategies of the israeli religious 
Parties, 1981–1984’, in The Elections in Israel—1984, ed. a. arian and M. shamir (tel aviv: ramot, 1986). pp. 79–95); and 
e. don-Yehiya, ‘the resolution of religious Conflicts in israel’, in Conflict and Consensus in Jewish Political Life, ed. s.a. 
Cohen and e. don-Yehiya (tel aviv, israel: Bar-ilan university Press, 1986), pp. 203–218.
28a. Çarkoğlu, ‘the turkish Party system in transition: Party Performance and agenda Change’, Political Studies, 46(3) (1998), 
pp. 544–571.
29Y. hazama, ‘social Cleavages and electoral support in turkey: toward Convergence?’, The Developing Economies, 41(3) 
(2003), pp. 362–387.
30Çarkoğlu and hinich, ‘a spatial analysis of turkish Party Preferences’.
31e. lindqvist and r. Östling, ‘Political Polarization and the size of Government’, American Political Science Review, 104(3) 
(2010), pp. 543–565, shows that turkey ranks among the most highly polarized countries (ninth out of 74 countries). see 
also, akın h. Ünver, ‘turkey’s invisible Cold War: islamist and secular Communalizations’, Yale Journal of International 
Affairs, 6(1) (2011), pp. 102–104; e.f. Keyman, ‘the aK Party: dominant Party, new turkey and Polarization’, Insight Turkey, 
16(2) (2014), pp. 19–31; and Y. Kaya and l. sunar, ‘the Culture Wars redux? the Polarization of social and Political attitudes 
in turkey’, Social Currents, 2(4) (2015), pp. 393–412 on rising political polarization in turkey.
32for turkish military regimes, see W. hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (london: routledge, 1993); and Ü. Cizre-
sakallıoğlu, ‘Problems of democratic Governance of Civil-Military relations in turkey and the european union enlargement 
Zone’, European Journal of Political Research, 43(1) (2004), pp. 107–125. for discussions of more recent interventions, 
see n. narlı, ‘Civil-Military relations in turkey’, Turkish Studies, 1(1) (2000), pp. 107–127.
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES  445
predominant party system.33 Although our article—for reasons of comparison—focuses 
solely on the 2011 general elections, Turkey has seen a downturn in democratic governance 
recently, experiencing a failed military coup in July 2016 and significant democratic back-
sliding in its aftermath. The continuous formation of new parties and shifts in existing political 
organizations have rendered Israel one of the most volatile electoral democracies among 
established democracies. While Israel has remained the most resilient democratic regime in 
the region,34 it does experience huge security issues both inside and outside its borders, 
providing political leaders who have a military background with an edge over politicians 
with a purely civilian career.
Despite these serious reservations on democratic consolidation as conceptualized here, 
our other three cases—Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia—are clearly on the opposite side of the 
stability spectrum. Morocco, where we collected data during the 2011 parliamentary elec-
tion, is a monarchic authoritarian regime with severe restrictions and limitations on demo-
cratic freedoms for political parties and voters. Despite this repression, Tessler and Gao found 
that the Moroccan public was one of the most supportive of democracy in the Arab World.35 
The regime tried to absorb these pro-democratic tendencies by implementing largely cos-
metic political reforms and minor democratic openings under royal tutelage in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, by integrating the Islamist Justice and Development Party (J.D.P.) into the 
party system. However, simultaneously using various policies, the monarchy shielded itself 
from any meaningful opposition. Mass protests against the regime during the Arab Spring 
began to threaten the status quo, but King Mohammad VI was able to control the political 
crisis by holding early parliamentary elections and initiating minor constitutional reform. 
Buehler argues that the regime conducted elections as a ‘safety-valve’ for the authoritarian 
system, which eventually backfired by the J.D.P.’s rise, albeit resulting only in minor political 
concessions and the writing of a new constitution.36 Also, in a comparison of Egyptian and 
Tunisian constitutional assemblies, Hartshorn shows that the Moroccan constitutional com-
mission can follow a path similar to those of both Egypt and Tunisia.37 Before these reforms 
were implemented, the King was authorized to appoint and dismiss all prominent political 
figures. Although post-Arab Spring reforms somewhat increased the power of the executive 
and legislature, political elites continue to be selected at the King’s discretion (or minimally 
Makhzen approval). Moroccan political parties are still prevented from responding to voter 
preferences because of continued limits on party platforms and electoral campaigns, which 
has caused political parties like An-Nahj La Voix Démocratique and Parti de l’Avant-garde 
Démocratique et Socialiste to boycott the parliamentary elections.
33for some relevant news articles on the coup and the post-coup period restrictions, see, d.h. Kinney, ‘Civilian actors in the 
turkish Military drama of July 2016’, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Note, 10 (2016), pp. 1–12; P. Kingsley, ‘turkey in turmoil 
and Chaos since Purge aimed at dissenters’, The New York Times, 12 april 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/12/
world/europe/turkey-erdogan-purge.html (accessed on January 18, 2018); alison abbott, ‘turkey sacks thousands of 
university staff’, Nature, 6 september 2016, http://www.nature.com/news/turkey-sacks-thousands-of-universi-
ty-staff-1.20550 (accessed on January 18, 2018).
34see Polity iV country trends: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
35M.a. tessler and e. Gao, ‘Gauging arab support for democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 16(3) (2005), pp. 83–97.
36M. Buehler, ‘safety-Valve elections and the arab spring: the Weakening (and resurgence) of Morocco’s islamist opposition 
Party’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 25(1) (2013), pp. 137–156; M. Buehler, ‘Continuity through Co-optation: rural 
Politics and regime resilience in Morocco and Mauritania’, Mediterranean Politics, 20(3) (2015), pp. 364–385.
37i.M. hartshorn, ‘organized interests in Constitutional assemblies: egypt and tunisia in Comparison’, Political Research 
Quarterly, 70(2) (2017), pp. 408–420.
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Furthermore, continued incorporation of party elites into the monarchic orbit hinders 
parties’ congruence with their voters’ preferences. One example of this was the establishment 
of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (A.M.P.) in 2007 by Fouad Ali El Himma, a close friend 
of the King. Independent M.P.s and political notables were successfully integrated into the 
ruling elite close to the monarchy through the machinations of the A.M.P.38 Besides the role 
of political Islamism, Morocco lacks clear-cut political cleavages when compared with the 
Turkish and Israeli cases. Both the lack of well-established political cleavages and the incor-
poration of parties into the monarchy inhibit party system congruence with voters’ policy 
preferences in Morocco. In fact, Wegner and Pellicer suggest that support for Moroccan 
Islamists is based on fluid and various reasons and motivations which are not ideological.39
Following the upheavals brought by the Arab Uprisings, Tunisia and Egypt are still in the 
process of political transition with uncertain outcomes.40 Notwithstanding the uncertainty 
of the direction of change, it is clear that neither can claim democratic consolidation. 
Additionally, it is questionable whether we can observe a ‘structural change’ in the region 
after the Arab Spring. In fact, recent comparisons from the post-2011 period suggest the 
revival of authoritarian rule in Egypt. Also in Tunisia, democratic procedures may not be able 
to solve problems of political economy according to Hinnebusch. While Tunisia has held 
constituent assembly elections and presidential elections that were relatively free, Egypt 
has been sliding back into military authoritarianism after annulled legislative elections, the 
ousting of an elected president and the renewed military control of the state. Both countries 
initially saw a plethora of new parties being established and legally recognized after the 
uprisings. With their well-established social networks and clientelistic practices, the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamist movements were best equipped to respond to the material 
needs of their constituents.41 This institutionalization of incentive provision mechanisms 
through vast social networks gave the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, 
the Freedom and Justice Party (F.J.P.), a distinct advantage over its competitors. However, 
both the Islamist and the secular fronts failed to present a substantiated electoral platform. 
According to Hassan, party manifestoes ‘addressed Egypt’s most pressing problems like 
unemployment, education, and healthcare with extremely general phrases and promises 
of increased spending without specifying how the suggested measures will be financed’.42 
Indeed, deep divisions and high levels of political polarization between Islamists and liberals 
over the institutional framework for Egypt and the role of religion in public life obscured the 
debate on substantive policy issues on the socio-economic dimension.
38J. liddell, ‘notables, Clientelism and the Politics of Change in Morocco’, The Journal of North African Studies, 15(3) (2010), 
pp. 315–331.
39M. Pellicer and e. Wegner, ‘socio-economic Voter Profile and Motives for islamist support in Morocco’, Party Politics, 20(1) 
(2014), pp. 116–133.
40We thank our anonymous reviewers for suggesting this argument on ‘authoritarian updating’. for further discussions, see 
r. hinnebusch, ‘Change and Continuity after the arab uprising: the Consequences of state formation in arab north african 
states’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 42(1) (2015), pp. 12–30.
41for work on islamism’s strength in egypt see, M. Brocker and M. Künkler, ‘religious Parties: revisiting the inclusion-
Moderation hypothesis’, Party Politics, 19(2) (2013), pp. 171–186; J. Clark, ‘social Movement theory and Patron-clientelism. 
islamic social institutions and the Middle Class in egypt, Jordan, and Yemen’, Comparative Political Studies, 37(8) (2004), 
pp. 941–968; l. diamond, ‘Why are there no arab democracies?’, Journal of Democracy, 21(1) (2010), pp. 93–112; t. 
Masoud, Counting Islam: Religion, Class, and Elections in Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2014); and n.J. 
davis and r.V. robinson, Claiming Society for God: Religious Movements and Social Welfare in Egypt, Israel, Italy, and 
the United States (Bloomington: indiana university Press, 2012).
42M. hassan, ‘elections of the People’s assembly, egypt 2011/12’, Electoral Studies, 32(2) (2013), pp. 370–374.
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES  447
Tunisia endured an autocratic regime under Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, albeit somewhat 
different from Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt. Early on in his term, Ben Ali initiated reforms by legal-
izing previously banned political parties and releasing some Islamist political prisoners. 
Tunisia remained one of the most likely candidates to experience a liberalizing transition 
according to Noland’s spatial and socio-demographic models.43 A stilted transition to democ-
racy was only realized in early 2011 when Ben Ali was forced out of office by severe social 
protest and pressure from political and economic elites, and the first free and fair elections 
were held in late 2011. Most political parties were founded or recognized after the revolution, 
except for the secular-leftist Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties (D.F.L.L.) and the 
Progressive Democratic Party (P.D.P.).
Ennahda, a moderate Islamist party, gained most support during the elections, winning 
89 out of 217 seats, while an entirely unknown party of a media mogul (suspected of ancien 
régime connections) came in second. However, political developments after the elections—
including the assassination of prominent political opposition figures—served as early indi-
cations that a transition towards democracy, let alone consolidation and institutionalization 
of democracy, is a cumbersome process. Compared to Morocco and Egypt, the Tunisian case 
may be more promising, and the country underwent a second election in 2014 with a peace-
ful change of government. Additionally, the Islamist movement in Tunisia as represented by 
Ennahda attempted to lessen the rift within the country’s conservative–secular social cleav-
age. The party’s electoral victory and cross-ideological coalition in 2011 suggest that the 
party became a mainstream, moderate conservative party following the Arab Spring. As we 
will further describe in our findings, Ennahda could not reach out to potential voters by 
mobilizing Islamists by specific policy issues. Then, following its electoral victory, the party 
accepted democratic procedures and continues to be a highly relevant, moderate political 
force for the conservative constituents in the country. By accepting to step down in 2013 
after months of political turmoil and agreeing to negotiate with secular opposition groups, 
Ennahda lessened the rifts and polarization in the country even if it could not respond to 
potential constituents by specific policy positions back in the 2011 elections. In this respect, 
in succeeding elections, we would expect Ennahda and other parties to be better able to 
address specific policy concerns of Tunisian voters. But still, Benstead suggests that security 
concerns and stability are important motivating factors for Tunisians.44 The early indicators 
of democratization and consolidation are more promising in Tunisia, and this case comprises 
the middle ground of our five cases.
These five cases represent a range of variation in democratic consolidation and the level 
at which political parties are historically bound, institutionalized or ideologically grounded 
in society. This gradation in party institutionalization and cleavage linkage to voter prefer-
ences can be seen as a ranking in which Israel is the most consolidated electoral democracy, 
followed by Turkey (at least until the 2011 elections). On the complete opposite side is 
Morocco, which is a non-competitive authoritarian regime. Egypt, particularly after the 
renewed takeover by the military, is closer to the authoritarian pole than the democratic 
43M. noland, ‘explaining Middle eastern Political authoritarianism i: the level of democracy’, Review of Middle East Economics 
and Finance, 4(1) (2008), pp. 1–30.
44l.J. Benstead, ‘Why do some arab Citizens see democracy as unsuitable for their Country?’, Democratization, 22(7) (2015), 
pp. 1183–1208.
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side, with Tunisia being in the middle of the distribution. To test these relative levels of party 
institutionalization and convergence towards electoral preferences, we use original data-sets 
that were collected in recent elections in each of these cases.
Method and data
To gather data on voters’ opinions on issues and party (or candidate) positions on the same 
issues, we developed V.A.A. in all five countries.45 We offered access to the electorates at large 
via mass media during post-Arab uprising elections between 2011 and 2014. We collaborated 
with local academics and media venues to design relevant questionnaires and then distrib-
uted them through journalists and/or online web pages of our media partners.46
In all these online applications, we asked voters their opinion on substantive policy issues, 
leadership evaluation and their vote propensities. The latter was measured for each given 
party (or presidential candidate) by asking users how likely they were to vote for all relevant 
political parties (or candidates) running in the election, with answer categories ranging from 
0 (not likely at all) to 10 (very likely to vote). We use these propensities to vote (P.T.V.) and 
the agreement between respondents and all of the relevant political parties (candidates) to 
evaluate how likelihood to vote for a party is linked to policy preference congruence (or 
distance) between respondents and political parties. From analyses of advanced and insti-
tutionalized democracies, we know that closer policy distance between parties and voters 
is associated with high levels of P.T.V.47
Next, we analysed how voters and parties align along the major political lines of division 
in each country using two main conflict dimensions in each country. These dimensions differ 
across countries, but in general, they reflect the cultural and economic cleavage structures 
in each context. We assess party–voter congruence by measuring the Euclidean distance 
between voters and the four largest political parties in their country. This distance is based 
on 30 pre-determined policy preference questions relevant to the electoral campaign in 
each country, which were developed by scholars who are country experts.48 These issues 
relate to both the economic dimension and the cultural cleavage of social change vs. con-
servatism. Official positions on issues for each party were extracted from their election man-
ifestos or websites by a team of trained—native-speaking—academics in each country, after 
which a measurement based on the spatial distance of the respondent from each of the 
political parties was calculated. Based on the Downsian spatial voting argument, this calcu-
lation should suggest a negative correlation between the respondent’s likelihood to vote 
45for examples of V.a.a. see, Krouwel, Vitiello and Wall, ‘Voting advice applications as Campaign actors’; and a.P.M. Krouwel 
and a. van elfrinkhof, ‘Combining strengths of Methods of Party Positioning to Counter their Weaknesses: the development 
of a new Methodology to Calibrate Parties on issues and ideological dimensions’, Quality & Quantity, 48(3) (2014), 
pp. 1455–1472.
46for an example of how journalists and social media have an impact on distribution of V.a.a., see the study on the turkish 
case by: a. Çarkoğlu, t. Vitiello and M. Moral, ‘Voter advice applications in Practice: answers to some Key Questions from 
turkey’, International Journal of Electronic Governance, 5(3–4) (2012), pp. 298–317.
47C. Van der eijk et al., ‘rethinking the dependent Variable in Voting Behavior: on the Measurement and analysis of electoral 
utilities’, Electoral Studies, 25(3) (2006), pp. 424–447.
48the online appendix presents these 30 questions across our cases. for a full methodology of the text-based hand-coding 
of parties see, Krouwel and van elfrinkhof, ‘Combining strengths of Methods’; a.P.M. Krouwel and M.t. Wall, ‘from text to 
the Construction of Political Party landscapes. a hybrid Methodology developed for Voting advice applications’, in From 
Text to Political Positions. Text Analysis across Disciplines (discourse approaches to Politics, society and Culture), ed. B. 
Kaal, i. Maks and a. elfrinkhof (amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2014), pp. 275–296; and Krouwel, Vitiello and Wall, ‘Voting 
advice applications as Campaign actors’.
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for a certain party and the respondent’s distance to that party. In other words, the lower the 
respondent’s distance to a party, the more likely the respondent is to judge that party pos-
itively (with a high P.T.V. score).
We selected the four largest parties in each of our five party systems, as we assumed that 
voters would be most familiar with their issue stances, compared to smaller, marginal parties 
(Table 1). The total share of the electorate represented by these parties differs across cases 
which suggests a variance in the effective number of parties (E.N.P.) in each country. The 
highest share of votes was observed in the 2011 Turkish general elections where the four 
largest parties made up 95.4 per cent of total votes. Due to considerable fragmentation, the 
lowest share of votes was observed in the 2013 Israeli general elections with the four largest 
parties garnering a mere 49.1 per cent of total votes. In fact, calculations of E.N.P. according 
to Laakso and Taagepera’s formula49 indicate that Turkey had the lowest E.N.P. with 2.96 
parties while Israel had the largest E.N.P. with 8.68 parties. This finding is not surprising, given 
the unusually high level of electoral threshold in Turkey (10%), but this cannot account for 
the variance in E.N.P. as Israel is the second country in our cases to have an electoral threshold 
whereas the other three cases do not have any electoral threshold.
To ensure the accuracy of each V.A.A., we conducted a quality check and removed 
respondents not residing within the country and those who did not respond to the V.A.A. 
in their native language (Arabic, Hebrew or Turkish for respective countries).50 On average, 
25 per cent of respondents were removed in the logic check (see Table 2). We only used 
respondents that fully completed the V.A.A. questionnaire. The final data-sets were com-
prised only of respondents who answered not only all issue questions but also the vote 
propensity question in their respective native languages and resided within the geographical 
boundaries of the countries in question (determined by a geo-location variable that was 
Table 1. six elections, four largest parties and their vote shares.
*likud and israel Beitenu formed an electoral alliance on 25 october 2012, approximately 3 months before the election. 
of the 31 seats won by the coalition, 20 were given to members of likud while 11 were given to israel Beitenu. turkish 
republican People’s Party is abbreviated as r.P.P.
Turkey—2011 Israel—2013 Egypt—Parliament 2011
J.d.P. 49.83 israel Beitenu* 23.34 f.J.P. 37.5
r.P.P. 25.98 al-nour 27.8
n.a.P. 13.01 Yesh atid 14.33 n.W. 9.2
P.d.P. 6.57 labor 11.39 f.e.P. 8.9
total vote share 95.39 49.06 83.4
effective number of parties 2.96 8.68 4.20
tunisia—2011 Morocco—2011 egypt—Presidential 2012
ennahda 37.04 J.d.P. 22.8 Morsi 24.78
C.P.r. 8.71 istiqlal 11.9 shafik 23.66
forum 7.03 n.r.o.i. 11.3 sabahi 20.72
P.d.P. 3.94 a.M.P. 11.1 aboulfotouh 17.47
total vote share 56.72 57.1 86.63
effective number of parties 4.78 7.95 4.92 (first round)
49M. laakso and r. taagepera, ‘effective number of Parties: a Measure with application to West europe’, Comparative Political 
Studies, 12(1) (1979), pp. 3–27.
50We thank our anonymous reviewers for raising the issue of some social groups in tunisia and Morocco who can genuinely 
prefer french over arabic. We replicated the analyses presented here with these groups in the online appendix in the 
section ‘replicating findings with french speakers in tunisia and Morocco’, which also presents some additional details 
about language choices across our V.a.a.
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automatically generated). Summary statistics (Table 2) indicate that there was considerable 
variance between countries on the number of V.A.A. respondents.
Given the limits of online sampling techniques, one methodological criticism of conduct-
ing research with opt-in, non-probability V.A.A. data is the problem of representativeness.51 
While probability samples also suffer from selection bias and over-representation of certain 
groups, one would assume that an online, opt-in survey like a V.A.A. cannot claim to be 
representative of the total population. This is particularly the case in countries with lower 
51one alternative to account for this problem of representativeness is to weigh the sample by referring to census data. When 
we conducted the analyses presented here with region and gender weights which are available for turkey and israel, the 










eGYPt Parliament    MoroCCo     
dist_fjp 59,605 0.93 0.56 0 4.47 dist_jdp 19,688 0.83 0.49 0 4.61
dist_nour 59,605 1.67 0.61 0 5.32 dist_istiqlal 19,688 0.68 0.42 0 3.13
dist_wafd 59,605 1.32 0.54 0 3.66 dist_rally 19,688 1 0.46 0 3.34
dist_fep 59,605 1.91 0.61 0 4.58 dist_amp 19,688 1.14 0.44 0 3.63
ptv_fjp 42,181 5.43 4.1 0 10 ptv_jdp 16,009 5.98 4.04 0 10
ptv_nour 36,456 3.45 3.97 0 10 ptv_istiqlal 14,770 1.4 2.62 0 10
ptv_wafd 35,175 3.32 3.54 0 10 ptv_rally 14,239 1.8 2.89 0 10
ptv_fep 34,704 4.04 3.88 0 10 ptv_amp 14,270 1.3 2.56 0 10
age 39,275 30.86 10.74 18 78 age 14,531 31.57 11.1 18 78
education 39,376 4.81 0.59 0 5 education 14,995 4.50 0.97 0 5
Gender 38,255 0.28 0.45 0 1 Gender 14,521 0.25 0.43 0 1
eGYPt President    tunisia     
dist_
morsy
63,820 1.49 0.48 0 3.71 dist_nahda 11,253 1.26 0.56 0 3.44
dist_shafik 63,820 1.91 0.5 0 4.06 dist_con-
gress
11,253 1.22 0.55 0 2.92
dist_
sabahi
63,820 1.19 0.47 0 4.17 dist_forum 11,253 1.69 0.59 0 2.55
dist_fot-
ouh
63,820 0.98 0.4 0 3.56 dist_pdp 11,253 1.48 0.52 0 2.75
ptv_morsy 35,959 2 3 0 10 ptv_nahda 9441 2.82 3.97 0 10
ptv_shafik 37,112 1.75 2.9 0 10 ptv_con-
gress
8507 5.33 4.21 0 10
ptv_
sabahi
36,519 4.47 3.56 0 10 ptv_forum 8676 2.4 3.32 0 10
ptv_fot-
ouh
37,569 3.91 3.54 0 10 ptv_pdp 8728 1.34 2.85 0 10
age 50,210 30.78 10.58 18 78 age 9083 33.02 11.74 18 78
education 50,453 4.82 0.57 0 5 education 9320 4.73 0.74 0 5
Gender 48,786 0.24 0.42 0 1 Gender 9117 0.58 0.49 0 1
israel     turKeY     
dist_likud 85,727 1.5 0.8 0 3.96 dist_jdp 60,004 0.62 0.34 0 4.01
dist_beit 85,727 1.86 0.77 0 4.32 dist_rpp 60,004 0.64 0.31 0 4.05
dist_yesh 85,727 0.92 0.54 0 3.93 dist_nap 60,004 0.8 0.37 0 3.69
dist_labor 85,727 1.6 0.8 0 4.45 dist_pdp 60,004 0.75 0.36 0 4.21
ptv_likud 62,190 3.99 3.6 0 10 ptv_jdp 49,485 3.25 3.99 0 10
ptv_beit 60,646 2.14 2.99 0 10 ptv_rpp 49,737 5.03 3.68 0 10
ptv_yesh 60,396 4.24 3.36 0 10 ptv_nap 47,317 4.83 3.64 0 10
ptv_labor 61,546 4.45 3.41 0 10 ptv_pdp 46,277 3.08 3.42 0 10
age 86,404 33.80 12.96 18 87 age 57,725 32.91 12.05 18 88
education 90,839 3.61 1.50 0 5 education 58,426 4.63 0.65 0 5
Gender 92,098 0.40 0.49 0 1 Gender 58,105 0.23 0.42 0 1
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES  451
Internet penetration as are found in the Middle East. Despite the obvious shortcomings of 
every survey and sample methodology, online sampling techniques enable researchers to 
collect large-N samples from respondents that are very willing to fill out long and complex 
questionnaires. Online surveys can be more easily adapted and are more flexible than face-
to-face surveys. In our study, V.A.A. allowed us to gather a greater amount of data from a 
larger number of voters when compared to traditional surveys by combining wide-ranging 
information about their political behaviour, their opinions and their background character-
istics. Also, studies have shown that computerized self-administration reduces measurement 
error relative to other modes of data collection, increasing both the level of responses and 
the reported accuracy of opinions and attitudes when compared with more ‘conventional’ 
surveys.52 Moreover, online survey questions are answered more truthfully and carefully 
than interviewer-administered surveys.53 Also, the immediate reward of a personalized out-
come that compares individual preferences with party positions is an incentive to be truthful. 
This combination of self-selection and self-administration leads to a pool of respondents 
that are less likely to misreport their preferences and behaviours, meaning measurement 
errors should be smaller.
More importantly, for this study, we cannot use traditional surveys or national elections 
studies, as such studies simply do not exist in several of our cases or there are legal and 
practical obstacles in surveying the population. For example, no national election study has 
been conducted in Egypt, Tunisia or Morocco. Given the difficulties of conducting nationally 
representative electoral surveys in non-democratic countries, Middle Eastern cases are espe-
cially suitable for utilizing V.A.A.54 As a result, V.A.A. data provide researchers with more 
precise placements of voters and parties on issues that can be aligned along multiple salient 
political dimensions. Our analysis also demonstrates that studies based on V.A.A. samples 
have face validity that can help us explain important political developments in different 
parts of the world.
Most V.A.A. use a linear definition of distance by computing the agreement between a 
voter and each of the parties or candidates for each issue included in the test. Eventually, 
users simply get a ranking of parties, with the top choice being the party with the largest 
overlap in terms of users’ issue positions. In contrast, the V.A.A. we developed place users 
and parties in a multidimensional political space, based on averaged aggregated positions 
for parties and individual voters.55 Each set of specific questions was scaled to specific cleav-
age dimensions that differ from country to country.56 Our V.A.A. also compare the personal 
issue positions of respondents with the official issue positions of parties, based on the idea 
that opinions on individual issues can be assigned to a limited number of issue dimensions. 
In the graphical representation offered to the respondent at the end of the V.A.A., the result 
is the aggregated mean of all positions on each of the issue dimensions. Thus, the V.A.A. 
52see for instance, f. Kreuter, s. Presser and r. tourangeau, ‘social desirability Bias in Cati, iVr, and Web surveys: the effects 
of Mode and Question of sensitivity’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 72(5) (2008), pp. 847–865; and J.W. sakshaug, t. Yan and 
r. tourangeau, ‘nonresponse error, Measurement error, and Mode of data Collection’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 74(5) 
(2010), pp. 907–933.
53K. olson, ‘survey Participation, nonresponse Bias, Measurement error Bias, and total Bias’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 70(5) 
(2006), pp. 737–758.
54it is important to underline that there are efforts for representative surveys in the region as well. one prominent example 
is the arab Barometer. however, as noted already, the arab Barometer and other similar surveys, such as the World Values 
survey, do not have similar questions or items that are comparable across our cases.
55Krouwel and Wall, ‘from text to the Construction of Political Party landscapes’.
56Krouwel, Wall and Vitiello, ‘the Practicalities of issuing Vote advice’.
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combine preferences per dimension based on a Euclidean distance model and summarize 
this into a personalized party–voter comparison.
In the V.A.A. implemented in our five cases, two to six dimensions (in the case of Israel) 
were used: all V.A.A. initially provided a comparison between voter and parties along a 
socio-economic left–right dimension and a ‘moral’ social liberal–conservative dimension. In 
Turkey and Israel, the precise labels connected with these dimensions vary, while coun-
try-specific issues were developed that reflected the most significant political cleavages in 
that particular case. The ever-present economic left–right dimension includes questions that 
deal with the state’s role in the economy, socio-economic redistribution, levels of taxation, 
subsidies and social security provisions. The religious-moral dimension that pits social liberals 
vs. conservatives, on the other hand, included very different issues in each country, but 
always addressed Islamic religious norms and values, personal freedoms of expression, press 
freedoms and gender equality, among others. In Israel, the structure of the political system 
and the nature of social cleavages were more complex, necessitating higher dimensionalities 
that related to security issues, particularly concerning the Israel–Palestine conflict.
Findings
Our first results are based on graphical linkages between voters’ scores on P.T.V. questions 
and their distance to official party positions as diagnosed by the country experts. We expect 
that as an individual’s distance from a party’s positions increases, their likelihood to vote for 
that party will decline. For each case, we measured the average distance between the four 
largest parties and their relevant P.T.V. orders. In Israel, Turkey and Egypt’s parliamentary 
elections, the graphs confirm our expectations.
Turkey and Israel
For all of the four relevant parties in Turkey, as the distance between an individual and a 
political party in a two-dimensional space decreases, the likelihood to vote for that party 
increases. One exception is the Nationalist Action Party (N.A.P.). As the distance between an 
individual’s position and that of the N.A.P. increases, the likelihood to vote for the N.A.P. 
decreases only slightly. Several factors can explain this lack of congruence between voters 
and the N.A.P. First of all, the N.A.P. represents an ultranationalist far-right ideological heritage. 
It was the third largest party in the country and received around 13% of total votes in 2011. 
Questions that are relevant to nationalism and right-wing ideology are included in the Turkish 
V.A.A. However, the final issue positioning may not be capturing all the salient issues for the 
N.A.P. and its voters. Perhaps more importantly, the N.A.P. was hit by a series of scandalous 
events that brought the moral integrity of some of its leaders into question during the 
election campaign period of the 2011 general elections. In consequence, the linkage between 
the ideological distance and likelihood to vote for the N.A.P. was broken.
For the three other parties in Turkey, we observe that those who are close to the party in 
various policy issues were also inclined to support their respective party. For instance, 
Figure 1 suggests that those who were not likely at all to vote for the ruling A.K.P. (0 for P.T.V.) 
were more than two times farther away from the party’s policy positions (1.49) compared 
to someone who scored A.K.P. with a 10 on the P.T.V. scale (0.71). Similar patterns emerge 
for the other two opposition parties as well. This suggests that the V.A.A. issue questions 
BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES  453
were tapping into issues that are relevant for A.K.P. supporters and the party was responding 
to its constituents on such issues back in the 2011 general elections. Given the recent dem-
ocratic downturn in the country and the A.K.P.’s increasing dominance in party competition, 
we would expect to observe a decomposition in the congruence between supporters and 
the party platform.
Like in Turkey, results from Israel’s 2013 general elections show that the P.T.V. for one of 
the four largest parties increases as voters agree more with the relevant party’s policy stances 
on salient issues (Figure 2). Even if Israel is on the opposite side of the spectrum when com-
pared to Turkey regarding legislative fractionalization, they share an important empirical 
finding. Both Turkish and Israeli political parties are firmly embedded into cleavage struc-
tures. Hence in both countries, we observe a high degree of congruence between the like-
lihood to vote for a party and the distance from individual positions to political parties’ 
positions in the ideological space.
Similar to Turkey, the Israeli party system also had one party, Yesh Atid, for which the 
likelihood to vote is not very sensitive to distance in the ideological space. The party ran on 
a platform of change, reform and efficiency, and gained popularity thanks to its charismatic 
leader, Yair Lapid, who is a well-known media personality (and the son of another ‘flash-party’ 
politician). Compared to the more institutionalized and older parties in Israel’s party system, 
Yesh Atid was able to translate a different discourse into unexpected results at the ballot 
box. Results from our V.A.A. reveal that since Yesh Atid had taken a more centrist position, 
its average distance to voters is much smaller than any other party amongst the four parties 
included in our analysis. It is also striking to observe that the average ideological distance 
between those who would not consider voting for Yesh Atid (P.T.V. = 0) and those who would 
consider voting for Yesh Atid (P.T.V. = 10) is smallest amongst the four parties. In other words, 
Figure 1. average distance to parties across PtV scores, turkey 2011.
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similar to the N.A.P. in Turkey, preferences concerning Yesh Atid are driven not by spatial 
distance but by sui generis considerations that break the distance link to the likelihood of 
voting. In both countries, the two parties that had the least expected negative correlation 
between the ideological distance and the likelihood to vote for them appear to be the ones 
that are either new to the system (Yesh Atid) or occupy the most marginal positions (N.A.P.), 
with constituencies that would or would not consider voting for this party irrespective of 
the ideological distance. In consequence, we observe a weakening of the linkage between 
ideological distance and likelihood to vote for these parties.
Morocco
In this study, Morocco represents the other side of the political spectrum in the region. We 
compare transitioning countries and institutionalized electoral democracies with Morocco. 
While in Morocco some uprisings also ensued during the Arab Spring, the outcome was 
different than in Egypt and Tunisia. Early general elections were held in 2011, and the King 
quickly implemented a constitutional ‘reform’ package, which won almost universal support 
(with 98.5 per cent voting in favour). Although voter turnout for the constitutional referen-
dum was relatively high at nearly 75 per cent, turnout for the elections held in late November 
2011 was very low (45 per cent). This low mobilization potential of political parties suggests 
a low level of internal political efficacy which is to be expected in a country where the King’s 
authority overrides all legislative and executive powers.
Morocco is home to a multi-party system where political parties lack deep social roots. 
Three main parties, Istiqlal (Independents Party), the National Rally of Independents (N.R.o.I.) 
and the Authenticity and Modernity Party (P.A.M.), all represent the wealthy clique of 
Figure 2. average distance to parties across PtV scores, israel 2013.
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Moroccans known as the Makhzen. Istiqlal is a staunch defender of the monarchy and tra-
ditional monarchical authority, while P.A.M. and R.N.I. mainly include political figures with 
close royal connections. The largest party in the 2011 elections, the J.D.P., represents mod-
erate Islamism and is—as its name suggests—ideologically influenced by its Turkish coun-
terpart, the A.K.P. The Moroccan J.D.P. gained prominence in the late 1990s and became the 
second largest party in the 2007 legislative elections. Our empirical results as presented in 
Figure 3 and Table 4 indicate that besides the J.D.P., no other party is socially embedded in 
Moroccan society and no other party shows any sign of linkages with the voters. In fact, even 
the J.D.P.’s average likelihood to vote does not as expected go down as the distance grows. 
For instance, those respondents who indicated they were highly unlikely to vote for the J.D.P. 
(P.T.V. order of 1) were closer to the J.D.P.’s party platform than those who indicated an 
above-average likelihood to vote for the J.D.P. (P.T.V. order of 6). This pattern could be related 
to the fact that very few respondents in the opt-in sample gave the J.D.P. a P.T.V. of 1 (only 
3.5 per cent). Nevertheless, the J.D.P. seems to be the only party with some societal resonance 
in Morocco and appears to be the only viable challenger to the King. Pellicer and Wegner 
argue that the J.D.P. won almost all the votes of the educated middle class in the country. 
After the J.D.P. had won the 2011 elections, it was able to hold onto power unlike parties in 
Egypt and Tunisia, which have witnessed widespread political turmoil.
Tunisia and Egypt
Tunisia’s constituent assembly elections were held 10 months after the revolution, on 23 
October 2011.57 The four parties we include in Tunisia were all well institutionalized and 
established before the revolution. This stands in contrast to parties like Yesh Atid in Israel 
and the Free Egyptians Party (F.E.P.) in Egypt. The institutional strength of the parties, how-
ever, does not translate directly into social embeddedness or a competitive party system 
able to represent different social interests and conflict dimensions apart from the dominant 
Islamism vs. secularism divide. In this respect, the Tunisian case demonstrates a problem of 
interest articulation in democratic transition elections.
Tunisian elections also failed to show a gradually declining spatial proximity between 
parties and voters, based on their vote propensities. We do not observe a lowering of the 
likelihood to vote for any party as the distance between that party and the individual grows. 
In fact, the probability of voting for any Tunisian party appears to remain more or less con-
stant, irrespective of the distance a voter has towards that party in the issue space. Tunisia’s 
first democratic elections confirm the finding of earlier work on democratization, which 
argues that transition periods do not end with founding elections. This is evident in the 
failure of Tunisian party manifestoes to align with the preference structures of likely voters. 
The low congruence between parties and voters in Tunisia shows that the party system is 
still in transition and much more extensive voter–party interaction is necessary.
A good example is the Democratic Forum for Labor and Liberties party, which was allowed 
to function during Ben Ali’s reign. Unlike the Progressive Democratic Party (P.D.P.), the 
Democratic Forum did not boycott the rigged elections that Ben Ali staged before the rev-
olution. This early institutionalization of the Democratic Forum may have given this party 
57in tunisia, we could not include the fourth largest party, Current of love, of media mogul hamdi as this ‘flash’ party had no 
platform or presence before the election and was not included in the election Compass.
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an advantage, which may account for its somewhat higher level of party–voter linkage. 
However, earlier participation in the political process did not give the Democratic Forum 
much advantage on election day in 2011, as Ennahda received 37 per cent of the vote 
whereas the Democratic Forum received only 7 per cent of the vote. There is no clear pattern 
between parties being previously banned from politics and gaining support in Tunisia’s first 
post-revolutionary elections. This also becomes clear when we look at the Al-Arida Popular 
Petition party, which came in fourth in popular support (third in seats), being only developed 
shortly before the election, without a clear programme or clear-cut positions in the national 
political landscape. Our experts had not taken this party seriously as it simply promised 200 
dinar handouts to jobless people and a private investment of 2 billion dinars into the econ-
omy. Nevertheless, media-mogul Hamdi persuaded many Tunisians to support him. Our 
analysis indicates that an individual’s inclination to vote for any given party in Tunisia is not 
associated with the spatial proximity of a voter. Such weak cleavage articulation, congruence 
with constituency preferences and social embeddedness can also be seen in Morocco and 
Egypt.
Egyptian parliamentary elections were held in three stages between 28 November 2011 
and 11 January 2012. These were the first elections in the region in which the moderate 
Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, under the banner of the F.J.P., participated. The F.J.P. gained 
no less than 37.5 per cent of the votes, with the more radical Islamist Al-Nour Party coming 
in second with 27.8 per cent of the votes to the surprise of many observers. In total, these 
two Islamist parties accounted for over 65 per cent of the vote in this founding election.
Cross-party differences in vote propensities vs. spatial proximity also indicate that the 
only relevant cleavage in the Egyptian election was conservative Islamism vs. social liberalism 
(Figure 4). Our V.A.A. questionnaire included questions on the role of sharia in society and 
Figure 3. average distance to parties across PtV scores, Morocco 2011.
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economics, the political position of the Coptic minority as well as the role of women in 
politics and family life. We found that the standard deviation of respondents’ scores along 
the cultural-religious axis was higher than that of scores along the economic left–right axis. 
Both F.J.P. and Al-Nour were more communicative and responsive to their core electorate 
than the more liberal and leftist parties. Although Al-Nour was on average more distant to 
its core voters when compared to the F.J.P., this resulted in both Islamist parties showing a 
gradual decline in the likelihood to vote as the average distance between parties and voters 
grew.
Additionally, the right-wing F.E.P., which represents the more liberal segments of Egyptian 
society, showed a high degree of social embeddedness and voter linkage in our results. Its 
core constituency is made up of voters from the Coptic minority, the business community, 
social liberals and intellectuals. Given that these segments of civil society were the driving 
force behind the revolution, the F.E.P. appears to have been the best party in articulating 
their political concerns and thus clearly appealed to liberal, non-Islamist voters. Another 
non-Islamist party, New Wafd (N.W.), is the reincarnation of one of the oldest parties in Egypt, 
yet internal turmoil and an ill-conceived electoral alliance with the F.J.P. (which was cancelled 
shortly before the elections) undermined the party’s credibility among liberal voters. 
Competing in the elections independently, N.W. came in third with 9.2 per cent of the votes, 
just ahead of the social liberal Egyptian bloc, which consisted of the Egyptian Social 
Democratic Party, the F.E.P. and the Progressive Union Party and won 8.9 per cent of the 
votes. Despite its long history, our results show N.W. appeared to have the weakest articu-
lation and congruence with voter preferences of all Egyptian parties.
In Egypt’s 2012 presidential elections (Figure 5), the four top presidential candidates 
received 86.6 per cent of the vote, which resulted in the second round of run-off elections 
Figure 4. average distance to parties across PtV scores, egypy parliamentary elections 2011–2012.
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being between Mohamed Morsi (F.J.P.) and Ahmed Shafiq (running as an Independent, but 
aligned with the ancien régime). For the first round of this election, we developed a V.A.A. 
questionnaire addressing current salient issues, with each question scaled to either the 
cultural-religious or the economic left–right dimension. Among the respondents, we did 
not come across any meaningful pattern of spatial proximity and P.T.V. scores for candidates. 
For instance, voters who indicated they were highly unlikely to vote for Morsi (P.T.V. score of 
2) had an average distance similar to those who were staunch supporters of Morsi, giving 
the maximum P.T.V. value of 10. Similar low levels of interest and cleavage articulation were 
found for other candidates as well. In other words, voters who said they were very likely to 
vote for a candidate had similar distances with voters who indicated that they were not at 
all likely to vote for a given candidate.
One explanation is that with both major candidates being economically right-wing, there 
was only space for the articulation of the Islamist–liberal dimension, even though the main 
line of conflict was support for resistance to the former regime. Substantive issues were 
pushed back as the campaign centred on the extent to which the election would result in 
regime change and political elite replacement. A point of contention during the election 
was which new political figures would replace the old order. There was less evidence of this 
in the parliamentary elections as the old elite was barred from participating. Morsi won the 
presidency by a narrow 3 per cent margin. The discourse throughout the election did not 
focus on economic issues related to the left–right cleavage. Instead, the country became 
polarized over whether Islamist political figures were betraying the revolution, whether the 
J.D.P. constituted a real transition or whether the election of Morsi would lead to the 
Islamization of Egypt.
Figure 5. average distance to parties across PtV scores, egypy presidential elections 2012.
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The absence of any substantive competition between the presidential candidates and 
resulting problems with issue selection, as well as fewer respondents when compared to 
the parliamentary elections, may have impacted our ability to examine the cleavage dynam-
ics of the presidential elections. Furthermore, whether construct validity or substantive shifts 
and developments in Egypt explain the lack of presidential candidates’ parallelism with their 
constituency preferences requires further methodological research on V.A.A. design, which 
is outside the scope of this paper.
Discussion and conclusions
Our analysis on the spatial proximity of voters in Turkey, Israel, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia 
to parties they are highly likely to vote for suggests an overall very low social embeddedness 
of political parties, evidenced by low congruence between policy preferences of voters and 
policy positions of political parties.
To summarize all country analyses, Table 3 presents correlations between the P.T.V. and 
average spatial proximity of voters to political parties. When parties are socially embedded, 
responsive and provide a clear choice in democratic elections, we should expect to find sig-
nificant correlations between spatial proximity and vote propensities. In other words, as 
respondents who are closer to the party in the national political issue space appear more likely 
to vote for that party we should observe a negative correlation between distance and P.T.V.
Along with our discussion of the graphical findings presented earlier, we observe signif-
icant and negative correlations between distance and P.T.V. for all parties in our country 
sample except the Congress for the Republic (C.P.R). in Tunisia. The case of the C.P.R. is the 
only party with insignificant correlations between the distance measure and P.T.V. in our 
analyses. The fact that the C.P.R. has effectively disappeared from the electoral scene in the 
aftermath of the 2011 elections is evidence of low institutionalization that is expected to lie 
behind this insignificant linkage between the spatial distance between parties and voters 
and their propensity to vote for parties close to them.
To further substantiate these main findings, Table 4 summarizes the relationship between 
spatial distance and vote propensity through an ordinal logistic regression model with demo-
graphic controls. After controlling for age, education attainment and gender, we see that 
for most parties (except again the Tunisian C.P.R.), the distance in the issue space was inversely 
related to P.T.V., which is in line with the assumption that P.T.V. should decline as the spatial 
distance increases. The distance coefficients show that the strongest cleavage articulation 
and social embeddedness were found in Turkey, followed by Israel. Also, Egypt’s parliamen-
tary elections exhibited relatively strong connections between an individual’s distance from 
a party and the likelihood to support that party. A similar difference among elections is found 
with the degree of explanatory power of these models as reflected in the r-square values. 
The Israeli case has the highest average Nagelkerke r-square value at 0.29 followed by Turkey 
at 0.25. The Egyptian case follows closely behind with 0.21. Again, we saw that the Turkish 
N.A.P. and the Egyptian N.W. had low r-square values, indicating these parties were the least 
able to mobilize voters closest to them in the political space.
In conclusion, our findings suggest that the founding elections in post-Arab Spring Egypt 
and Tunisia were characterized by low correspondence between formal party positions on 
salient issues and voter preferences when translated into the distance in the national issue 
space. Overall, there was a muted articulation of deep social cleavages. Even though it is 
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unrealistic to expect transitioning democracies to have fully institutionalized parties, with 
clearly articulated ideologies, high party congruence with core electorate preferences and 
substantive articulation of main social cleavages, we were nevertheless surprised that so 
little party–voter linkage was detected. As the cases of Turkey and Israel show, with increased 
institutionalization of political parties, longer periods of electoral democracy, higher levels 
of press freedom and free formation of parties, voters develop stronger and more substantive 
ideological ties to political parties.
Table 4. explaining the Probability to Vote (P.t.V.) scores with distance in the issue space and demo-




Distance Female Education Age Constant r2 N
turkey J.d.P. −3.913*** −0.511*** −0.134*** −0.020*** 30.345*** 0.32 47,761
r.P.P. −3.704*** 0.481*** 0.050* 0.031*** 0.554 0.25 48,006
n.a.P. −1.404*** −0.388*** −0.163*** 0.008*** 31.319*** 0.07 45,728
P.d.P. −2.780*** −0.262*** −0.133*** −0.005*** 27.401*** 0.27 44,725
israel likud −2.879*** −0.416*** 0.090*** −0.013*** 8.559*** 0.43 55,900
israel 
Beitenu
−1.896*** −0.400*** −0.017* −0.013*** 6.388*** 0.27 54,543
Yesh atid −2.432*** 0.061* 0.129*** 0.002* 5.874*** 0.15 54,284
labor −2.066*** 0.001 0.048*** 0.006*** 7.325*** 0.25 55,311
Morocco J.d.P. −2.538*** 0.463*** −0.045*** −0.011* 7.882*** 0.11 11,496
istiqlal −0.084 −0.642*** 0.029 0.017*** 1.897*** 0.02 10,589
n.r.o.i. −0.715*** −0.920*** 0.078* −0.010*** 4.074*** 0.03 10,195
a.M.P. −0.981*** −0.453*** −0.079** −0.012*** 4.095*** 0.03 10,261
tunisia ennahda −2.707*** 1.242*** −0.385*** −0.018*** 5.743*** 0.09 7452
C.P.r. 0.275 0.321*** 0.131 −0.048*** 5.263*** 0.02 6765
forum −2.135*** −0.434*** 0.192** 0.024*** 5.349*** 0.06 6893
P.d.P. −0.959*** −0.719*** 0.02 0.043*** 3.398*** 0.04 6932
egypt 
President
Morsi −0.264*** −0.627*** −0.039 −0.002 3.426*** 0.01 28,355
shafik −0.773*** 0.138*** −0.135*** 0.019*** 3.176*** 0.03 29,067
sabahi −0.089* −0.228*** 0.348*** −0.006** 3.008*** 0.003 28,979
aboul 
fotouh
−0.106* −0.198*** 0.199*** −0.013*** 3.491*** 0.003 29,822
egypt 
Parliament
f.J.P. −3.556*** 0.699*** −0.332*** 0.008*** 9.188*** 0.25 27,596
al-nour −2.959*** 0.939*** −0.586*** 0.005* 10.021*** 0.25 23,996
n.W. −0.647*** 0.238*** −0.515*** 0.024*** 5.890*** 0.02 23,287
f.e.P. −3.147*** −0.543*** −0.186*** 0.015*** 11.330*** 0.28 22,780
Table 3. Correlation between Probability to Vote (P.t.V.) orders and voters’ distance to party.
note: all correlation coefficients are significant at p < 0.001.
Israel Turkey
likud −0.64 J.d.P. −0.54
israel Beitenu −0.50 r.P.P. −0.51
Yesh atid −0.39 n.a.P. −0.26
labor −0.49 P.d.P. −0.49
egypt Parliament Morocco
f.J.P. −0.49 J.d.P. −0.31
al-nour −0.47 istiqlal 0.012
n.W. −0.11 n.r.o.i. −0.11
f.e.P. −0.53 a.M.P. −0.16
tunisia egypt Presidential
ennahda −0.24 Morsy −0.04
C.P.r. 0.03 shafik −0.14
forum −0.16 sabahi −0.01
P.d.P. −0.07 aboulfotouh −0.01
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Although we have not touched upon it very much throughout the paper, comparing the 
Turkish A.K.P. and Tunisian Ennahda can be very telling since their trajectories yield interest-
ing results: an Islamist conservative party which represents its voters’ interests perfectly as 
Figure 1 on Turkey shows, and a party which aims for the same objective albeit without such 
perfect congruence (Figure 6). Yet, while the Turkish A.K.P. recently consolidated its power 
so as to initiate discussions of a full-fledged democratic backsliding among experts and 
pundits on Turkey,58 we do not observe a similar driving force of authoritarianism for Ennahda. 
This is an unexpected development for this study and it can relate to alternative motivating 
factors behind the vote choice and contextual developments in the two countries in more 
recent periods.
This study did not delve into alternative mechanisms through which voters select a party 
when policy issues are not salient. If some voters in our cases do not vote for the parties that 
are most congruent with them ideologically, what can be some alternative motivations for 
preferring a political party? As we suggested in our theoretical discussion, party systems 
with high levels of tribal allegiances and clientelistic mobilization patterns can attenuate 
ideological congruence and hinder its development.59 Additionally, in-group identification 
such as lineage ties, tribal networks and/or kinship can potentially reduce the effect of 
Figure 6. average distance to parties across PtV scores, tunisia 2011.
58for some recent studies on backsliding in turkey, see B. esen and Ş. Gümüşçü, ‘rising Competitive authoritarianism in 
turkey’, Third World Quarterly, 37(9) (2016), pp. 1581–1606; M. somer, ‘understanding turkey’s democratic Breakdown: 
old vs. new and indigenous vs. Global authoritarianism’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16(4) (2016), pp. 
481–503.
59for the role of clientelism in several Middle eastern countries, see e. lust, ‘Competitive Clientelism in the Middle east’, Journal 
of Democracy, 20(3) (2009), pp. 122–135; and d. Corstange, The Price of a Vote in the Middle East (new York, n.Y.: Cambridge 
university Press, 2016).
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ideological congruence. Voters may prefer a candidate or a party based on affinity and prox-
imity to specific families or tribes rather than policy positions or ideological congruence. 
Additionally, institutional configuration such as gender quotas can increase descriptive rep-
resentation and responsiveness as argued by Benstead.60 This paper suggests that in lieu of 
ideological congruence and lack of party consolidation, parties cannot reach out to voters 
and mobilize them by referring to salient policy issues. Instead, other mechanisms seem to 
counteract the lack of ideological congruence.
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